There are two principal approaches to anti-dilution provisions: the "Full Ratchet" and the "Weighted Average." These concepts tend to be explained by reference to computational formulas, which work off a variable called the "conversion price". Forget that. For two reasons. First, conversion price doesn't refer to currency but instead to an arbitrary ratio (usually 1 or .3 but it can be anything), so it's confusing. Second, the computation of the conversion price/ratio, while a necessary accounting tool, is a distraction from the operational result: the reallocation of stock from the founders to the angels.
Both approaches are based on the same predicate concern: what happens to the value of the angel's investment (in the form of preferred stock (that converts into common stock upon IPO/merger)) in the event that new stock is issued (sold) to someone else at a lower price (relative to that paid by the angel)?FN1
In most investment scenarios, like real estate, for example, if the post purchase market value is lower than the price paid, so it goes. That's the risk of real estate investment. The seller wouldn't retroactively kick in extra acreage or have a guest house built on the property to make the investor feel better.
Start-up financing does not operate like that. In the event the company's value goes down post purchase, anti-dilution provisions work to re-allocate shares from the existing common stock pool to the angel's preferred stock pool to make the angels feel better. The only question is, how many shares are re-allocated?
According to the Full Ratchet approach, the answer is: a lot. In fact, full ratchet does not even care about the number of the shares per se. It just cares about the bargain given to the new investors. How much are the new investors paying per share? That's deal the angel's now want.
An analogy would be you bought 10 pants at Banana Republic for $100 then someone else comes along and buys 10 pants for $10. Under FR, you get to say, 'Give me another 90 pairs of pants.'
It's called "Full Ratchet" because as a technical matter it demands that the ratio by which their preferred shares will be converted into common shares be retroactively decreased - "ratcheted down" - to the effective conversion ratio the new buyer is getting.FN2 The salient feature is that this occurs no matter how large or small the subsequent financing is (if - this is an extreme example - a company issues just 100 shares to subsequent investors at a $1.00 per share and the angels have 5,000 shares (for which they paid $10 per share), then under application of FR the angels gain (and the founders lose (the compensation has to come from somewhere)) an additional 45,000 shares.FN3
Weighted Average is a more measured approach. Although WA fixates on the deal the new buyers are getting, it takes into account the magnitude of the financing - how much new stock has been issued. The weight of the better deal price is balanced against the weight of the size of the purchase (similarly, the extent to which going 3 for 4 affects one's batting average depends on how late in the season the game is).FN4
There's a number of different formulas used for the calculation but as noted they aren't very intuitive so let's ignore them since the mathematical concept is straightforward. Take the post-money monetary value of the company under the old deal (just multiple the total number of company shares by the share price paid by the angel (in this case, $10 X the total number of shares (10,000 (assume 5,000 for angels, 5,000 for founders) = $100,000. This is our baseline company value under the old deal. Add to that the value being added by the new buyer - in this case $100 (100 shares at $1.00 per share). Divide (average out) that total value - $100,100 - by the total number of shares after the new buyer buys in: 10,100.
The number you get - $9.91 in this case - is going to be lower than the price paid by the angel - $10. It's an average between the old price and new price dependent on the aggregate number of shares being issued at the new price.FN2 How many shares does the angel's $50,000 investment get him now? Not 5,000 ($50,000/$10pershare) but 5,045 ($50,000/$9.91pershare).
FN1. "Original investor" and "new investor" are the two players here; "angels" is just shorthand for the former.
FN2. As noted, "conversion price" is misleading. The confusion becomes manifest in most examples you'll see - which will use $1 for the angel investment and then like fifty cents for the new investment and refer to these as conversion prices even though that is conflating two separate concepts. The conversion price is just the ratio by which preferred shares are converted into common shares, and often is 1:1 or .5:1. As a matter of fact, any investor will give a company a certain amount of money in exchange for a certain amount of preferred shares (which will have a certain price per share value that no one cares about) and THEN those shares will be deemed to convert to common shares according to a certain ratio.
FN3. Note that in these examples (and any such examples you'll see involving formulas) the calculation of the shares given to the new and old investors will be with respect to COMMON shares that the investors will eventually own. As indicated above no one really cares about how many preferred shares are being issued.
FN4. Under Weighted Average, the pants analogy works as such: There's 20 pairs of pants valued at $200 (you bought 10 for $100 and assume the founders also have 10). Add to the $200 valuation the $10 paid by the new buyers (for 10 pants). Divide $210 by the new total number of pants: 30, which equals $7. This becomes the retroactive price you paid. How many pants does $100 get you if it's $7 rather than $10 per pant? 14.28 instead of 10. Fashion for a fortnight.
Monday, February 21, 2011
Friday, February 18, 2011
Anti-Dilution Basics
Anti-dilution implicates two separate concepts, which tend to get muddled (like many words in the street glossary of financing, "dilution" has multiple meanings. Half of the expertise is being hip to the lingo).
First we have anti-dilution as the term is technically defined in term sheets, etc.: the proportional adjustment of stock ownership for a) internal recapitalizations (stock splits, stock dividends) or b) some exogenous transaction (i.e., a merger or, most significantly for this discussion, subsequent financing rounds). Within the context of the latter it means an angel's investment is protected from a future transaction in which the price-per-share is LOWER than the price-per-share they paid. It ONLY applies when the company's valuation GOES DOWN after the original investment. In VC parlance, it is "price-based protection" in the event of a "down-round."
Here's the relevant application: an angel investor has preferred stock (worth say $1.00 per share). The Company then creates and sells new stock (to say a VC) BUT at a price less than that (say $0.75 per share). Absent anti-dilution protection, there are now more shares in circulation and the average value of each share has gone down (to somewhere between 1 and .75 per share) so mathematically the angel's preferred stock has decreased in value.FN1
Anti-dilution mechanisms, however, work to give the angel FREE shares to compensate for the new stock being sold to the VC.FN2 The precise number of FREE shares depends on the anti-dilution mechanism (the most common being "full ratchet" and "weighted average" - the former is far more investor friendly) but the upshot is that the "value" of the original investor's investment will be maintained (or at least not lowered too much) despite the fact the market feels the company is performing more poorly than before (as evidenced by the lower valuation).
Note that the angel investor doesn't gain anything here. He just doesn't lose anything.FN3 Note also that this kind of anti-dilution is built (and usually only applies to "preferred" stock) into the charter documents.
Second, there are "pre-emptive rights" to participate in subsequent financing rounds - sometimes referred to as "right of first refusal" provisions - which effectively allow an angel investor to maintain his ownership PERCENTAGE by investing MORE money. In the parlance, this is the "right to maintain proportionate ownership”.
This right, as the parlance suggests, has a ceiling - typically "pro rata" to their existing ownership. Thus, if an investor has 10% ownership of a company and there is a new round of investment the investor has the right to invest enough money to maintain his 10% ownership but no more.
Pre-emptive rights are extraordinary rights which will not be inherent in a company's charter but rather provided (if at all) as part of a separate agreement (usually called an investor rights agreement) which accompanies the stock purchase (usually in connection with a Series A deal).
Note that if an angel lacks pre-emptive rights and the company valuation in a future round of financing increases, then anti-dilution does not apply. The angel's percentage ownership will necessarily be diluted due to the additional shares being put into circulation (i.e., a new claimant to the assets and/or income of a company reduces the percentage interests of the existing claimants), however, the overall value of his shares is going UP, due to the inflow of more capital, which naturally increases (at least for a time) the value of the company and any proportionate share in the company.
FN1. This presumes the net book/market value per share diminishes as a result of the financing. It's technically possible that the price per share paid by the VC investor for preferred was for some reason unaligned with the resulting book/market value of the common. This is unlikely but goes to show that the issue of dilution depends on what criteria are used to calculate the value.
FN2. The traditional mechanism by which this happens to angels is that the “Conversion Price” that determines the number of common shares the investor is entitled to receive upon conversion of the “preferred” stock is adjusted downward (by some pre-determined calculus), such that at the time of the future conversion, this investor will receive more shares in common stock (to compensate for the share value going down).
FN3. Somebody of course is losing - the founders and employees (or anyone else who owns the common stock). These parties are being diluted twice: once by the issuance of the shares to the new stockholders and a second time as a result of the adjustment to the conversion price of the preferred stock.
First we have anti-dilution as the term is technically defined in term sheets, etc.: the proportional adjustment of stock ownership for a) internal recapitalizations (stock splits, stock dividends) or b) some exogenous transaction (i.e., a merger or, most significantly for this discussion, subsequent financing rounds). Within the context of the latter it means an angel's investment is protected from a future transaction in which the price-per-share is LOWER than the price-per-share they paid. It ONLY applies when the company's valuation GOES DOWN after the original investment. In VC parlance, it is "price-based protection" in the event of a "down-round."
Here's the relevant application: an angel investor has preferred stock (worth say $1.00 per share). The Company then creates and sells new stock (to say a VC) BUT at a price less than that (say $0.75 per share). Absent anti-dilution protection, there are now more shares in circulation and the average value of each share has gone down (to somewhere between 1 and .75 per share) so mathematically the angel's preferred stock has decreased in value.FN1
Anti-dilution mechanisms, however, work to give the angel FREE shares to compensate for the new stock being sold to the VC.FN2 The precise number of FREE shares depends on the anti-dilution mechanism (the most common being "full ratchet" and "weighted average" - the former is far more investor friendly) but the upshot is that the "value" of the original investor's investment will be maintained (or at least not lowered too much) despite the fact the market feels the company is performing more poorly than before (as evidenced by the lower valuation).
Note that the angel investor doesn't gain anything here. He just doesn't lose anything.FN3 Note also that this kind of anti-dilution is built (and usually only applies to "preferred" stock) into the charter documents.
Second, there are "pre-emptive rights" to participate in subsequent financing rounds - sometimes referred to as "right of first refusal" provisions - which effectively allow an angel investor to maintain his ownership PERCENTAGE by investing MORE money. In the parlance, this is the "right to maintain proportionate ownership”.
This right, as the parlance suggests, has a ceiling - typically "pro rata" to their existing ownership. Thus, if an investor has 10% ownership of a company and there is a new round of investment the investor has the right to invest enough money to maintain his 10% ownership but no more.
Pre-emptive rights are extraordinary rights which will not be inherent in a company's charter but rather provided (if at all) as part of a separate agreement (usually called an investor rights agreement) which accompanies the stock purchase (usually in connection with a Series A deal).
Note that if an angel lacks pre-emptive rights and the company valuation in a future round of financing increases, then anti-dilution does not apply. The angel's percentage ownership will necessarily be diluted due to the additional shares being put into circulation (i.e., a new claimant to the assets and/or income of a company reduces the percentage interests of the existing claimants), however, the overall value of his shares is going UP, due to the inflow of more capital, which naturally increases (at least for a time) the value of the company and any proportionate share in the company.
FN1. This presumes the net book/market value per share diminishes as a result of the financing. It's technically possible that the price per share paid by the VC investor for preferred was for some reason unaligned with the resulting book/market value of the common. This is unlikely but goes to show that the issue of dilution depends on what criteria are used to calculate the value.
FN2. The traditional mechanism by which this happens to angels is that the “Conversion Price” that determines the number of common shares the investor is entitled to receive upon conversion of the “preferred” stock is adjusted downward (by some pre-determined calculus), such that at the time of the future conversion, this investor will receive more shares in common stock (to compensate for the share value going down).
FN3. Somebody of course is losing - the founders and employees (or anyone else who owns the common stock). These parties are being diluted twice: once by the issuance of the shares to the new stockholders and a second time as a result of the adjustment to the conversion price of the preferred stock.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Annual Meeting of Shareholders (For Start-Ups)
Most state business statutes (e.g., Section 211 of the Delaware code) require that all corporations incorporated in that state hold an annual meeting of the shareholders. The principal purpose of the meeting is for the election of directors (but any other business properly brought before the meeting may be transacted). This requirement cannot be evaded by provisions in the bylaws.FN1
There are four important caveats here. First, the shareholders do not need to actually physically convene in one location. A meeting by video or phone conference will suffice. Second, there does not need to be any special notice (absent any mandate in the bylaws or certificate of incorporation) to the shareholders so long as shareholders waive notice and consent to the holding of the meeting (note that meetings of the shareholders are usually subject to somewhat technical notice requirements). Third, although not all shareholders need to participate, a quorum - usually defined in the bylaws as a majority of the shares permitted to vote (in no case can it be less than one-third of the shares permitted to vote under Delaware law) - is necessary for any meeting action to have force. Fourth, and most importantly, IF there is unanimous consent (this should be evidenced by executed document) as to the election of the Directors, there is no need to hold the annual meeting at all (i.e., unanimous consent functions "in lieu of an annual meeting" as the statute says).FN2
As already indicated, any other proper business may be transacted at the annual meeting.FN3
So why bother? Failure to hold the meeting does not result in dissolution of the corporation or invalidate subsequent corporate action. Instead, if the corporation fails to hold an annual meeting within 30 days after the designated date or if no date has been designated within 13 months of last annual meeting (or date of incorporation) any stockholder or director may apply to the DE Court of Chancery for an order requiring the meeting to be held.
More generally, however, especially with respect to start-ups and other emerging companies, an annual meeting is 1) evidence that the corporation is not just a shell for the personal interests of a handful of people and 2) a cost-effective guard against future claim(s) that certain corporate decisions did not properly reflect shareholder interests. It's an easy meeting to transact and document (most start-ups will just need 1) a waiver of notice and consent signed by all the shareholders and 2) Minutes of the Meeting which identify the directors who have been elected (signed by the "Chair of the Meeting" (an officer or whoever else the bylaws permits to chair the meeting)) and provides some level of protection in the event of a subsequent shareholder suit.
FN1. The location (it can be remote) and time of this annual meeting is built into the bylaws or chosen by the directors if the bylaws are silent (typically, though the timing is linked to either the date of the prior year's annual meeting or the end of the corporation's fiscal year and the applicable state statute will generally set the corporation's principal office as the default meeting location). Note, however, that nearly all statutory allowances given to directors (with respect to choice of location or any matter, really) are qualified (at least under Delaware law) by a generalized rule of equity whereby a court may subsequently find a board action inequitable even if it technically complies with statutory requirements if its implementation compromised a shareholder's ability to participate.
FN2. Caveat to the caveat: In the event that consent from the shareholders is less than unanimous, action by written consent (rather than an actual in person meeting) is still permissible if all of the directorships are vacant and need to be filled by such action.
FN3. Note also that "special" meetings of the stockholders may be called from time to time, customarily by the board of directors but also by any such person as is authorized to call a meeting in the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws.
There are four important caveats here. First, the shareholders do not need to actually physically convene in one location. A meeting by video or phone conference will suffice. Second, there does not need to be any special notice (absent any mandate in the bylaws or certificate of incorporation) to the shareholders so long as shareholders waive notice and consent to the holding of the meeting (note that meetings of the shareholders are usually subject to somewhat technical notice requirements). Third, although not all shareholders need to participate, a quorum - usually defined in the bylaws as a majority of the shares permitted to vote (in no case can it be less than one-third of the shares permitted to vote under Delaware law) - is necessary for any meeting action to have force. Fourth, and most importantly, IF there is unanimous consent (this should be evidenced by executed document) as to the election of the Directors, there is no need to hold the annual meeting at all (i.e., unanimous consent functions "in lieu of an annual meeting" as the statute says).FN2
As already indicated, any other proper business may be transacted at the annual meeting.FN3
So why bother? Failure to hold the meeting does not result in dissolution of the corporation or invalidate subsequent corporate action. Instead, if the corporation fails to hold an annual meeting within 30 days after the designated date or if no date has been designated within 13 months of last annual meeting (or date of incorporation) any stockholder or director may apply to the DE Court of Chancery for an order requiring the meeting to be held.
More generally, however, especially with respect to start-ups and other emerging companies, an annual meeting is 1) evidence that the corporation is not just a shell for the personal interests of a handful of people and 2) a cost-effective guard against future claim(s) that certain corporate decisions did not properly reflect shareholder interests. It's an easy meeting to transact and document (most start-ups will just need 1) a waiver of notice and consent signed by all the shareholders and 2) Minutes of the Meeting which identify the directors who have been elected (signed by the "Chair of the Meeting" (an officer or whoever else the bylaws permits to chair the meeting)) and provides some level of protection in the event of a subsequent shareholder suit.
FN1. The location (it can be remote) and time of this annual meeting is built into the bylaws or chosen by the directors if the bylaws are silent (typically, though the timing is linked to either the date of the prior year's annual meeting or the end of the corporation's fiscal year and the applicable state statute will generally set the corporation's principal office as the default meeting location). Note, however, that nearly all statutory allowances given to directors (with respect to choice of location or any matter, really) are qualified (at least under Delaware law) by a generalized rule of equity whereby a court may subsequently find a board action inequitable even if it technically complies with statutory requirements if its implementation compromised a shareholder's ability to participate.
FN2. Caveat to the caveat: In the event that consent from the shareholders is less than unanimous, action by written consent (rather than an actual in person meeting) is still permissible if all of the directorships are vacant and need to be filled by such action.
FN3. Note also that "special" meetings of the stockholders may be called from time to time, customarily by the board of directors but also by any such person as is authorized to call a meeting in the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws.
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