Wednesday, May 25, 2011

83(b) Tax Elections

83(b) of the Internal Revenue Code is a niche tax-savings allowance for entrepreneurs and the tech geeks they hire (not the technical definition).

83(b) implicates the following: if you're a founder, an early employee or otherwise a recipient of RESTRICTED EQUITY ("equity" = stock or LLC units, etc. but NOT options (which aren't recognized as property by the IRS until exercise (but note that some options plans allow for early (prior to vesting) exercise and these options would be "restricted")); "restricted" = restrictions that lapse, typically due to vesting) in a start-up, then, presuming you'd rather pay less taxes than more, you should notify the IRS IMMEDIATELY upon receiving such equity (by filing an 83(b) notice).FN1

According to 83(b), if you voluntarily and timely (the 30 day(!) deadline is notoriously inflexible) notify the IRS that you've received such restricted equity, then you assume immediate income tax liability on the difference between the FMV of that equity (usually not much about zero (i.e., par value) in the inception stage of a start-up corporationFN2) and the amount you paid for that equity (usually par value or zero, as negotiated). At the future date when you later sell that equity, then you pay capital gains tax on the appreciation from the original date of purchase.FN3

If you fail to make that initial notification, you are taxed instead at each future vesting milestone (typically, at the year cliff and then monthly/annually for the next three years). This may have significant implications. For example:

Joe Founder is granted company stock at some nominal purchase (probably par value) price (say $0.01 per share) with a FMV of $0.001 per share. The stock has four year vesting with a one year cliff. Joe doesn't file an 83(b) election. At the end of the one year cliff, the stock having appreciated to $1.00/share, Joe recognizes and must taxes on $0.999/share of income for that year. As the remaining stock subsequently vests each year/month (whatever each vesting milestone is), Joe again recognizes and must pay ordinary income taxes on "income" (even though the stock is presumably illiquid and Joe can't sell it) equal to the difference between the (presumably rising) FMV of the newly vested portion and the original $0.001/share purchase price. Moreover, the company is required to pay the employer’s share of FICA tax on the income and to withhold federal, state and local income tax.
If Joe had made an 83(b) election, he would not recognize any income as the stock vests, because the 83(b) election forever freezes the income calculation as of the original grant date.

It almost always makes financial sense to file the 83(b), however, it does depend on the underlying value of the equity at the time of issuance and future prospects. In the odd circumstance that the equity at the time of grant has a material FMV AND there is a material risk that it won't increase in value (because, say, the start-up fails), you've accelerated your tax liability without receiving any benefit.

FN1. The mechanics of filing the 83(B) notice are surprisingly informal. While forms exist to facilitate the process, none are issued or required by the IRS. A handwritten note sent to your local IRS office (the full list of information that needs to be provided can be found here) would technically suffice. What really counts is the 30 day filing period. There is no extension available, or any simple cure for missing the deadline.

FN2. Note that Companies (via the Articles of Incorporation) typically assign a "par value" to stock (in some states its a requirement), which prohibits the Company from issuing stock to anyone at a price below that par value (i.e., no free stock).

FN3. The default Section 83 rule is that income (the difference between FMV and the price paid) on restricted stock is not recognized until the restrictions lapse. This rule is actually intended to benefit the taxpayer - the unique economics of start-ups undermine the intention.

Monday, May 23, 2011

Vesting: Single versus Double Trigger Acceleration

Most vesting provisions for restricted stock or stock options ("incentive equity") include acceleration provisions as insurance of sorts for employees and founders ("service providers").

The underlying concept is this: incentive equity typically vests on a four year schedule (as per market standard). Absent acceleration, if an event were to occur before the end of those four years - such as a sale of the all the assets of the company, a merger, or an IPO - that resulted in the service provider's termination (or resignation with good cause), then she'd lose the benefit of her expectation. She'd lose the right to the portion of the equity that hadn't vested - which happens to be precisely what certain interested parties (investors, new management/ownership, etc.) would like to see happen (because unvested restricted stock effectively vanishes and the rest of the shareholder base benefits proportionately from the reverse dilution) and why termination is such a real risk.FN1

Acceleration triggers guard against this. "Single" trigger refers to the automatic vesting of any unvested incentive equity upon the said event. "Double" trigger requires two events before the automatic vesting - not just the merger but the actual termination or early release of the service provider.

A common acceleration agreement averages the two triggers: combining 25% – 50% single trigger acceleration with 50% – 100% double trigger acceleration. Fairly convincing arguments are made that double trigger acceleration best balances the interests of service providers with interests of the company (entire shareholder base).FN2

It's all pretty straightforward stuff. One point to note: the trigger should run for a period of time before as well as after the transaction that constitutes the trigger event (or otherwise be constructed to to avoid any preemptive house cleaning before the transaction is done).

FN1.The assumptions behind the logic of what interested parties will want in the event of a merger/sale can get speculative but generally, regardless if the acquirer's interest is in company assets or people and /or if the equity at issue is unrestricted stock or stock options (Stock options, in contrast to unrestricted stock, "return" (to the extent they ever left) to the pool of stock reserved for employees (usually 5%-15% of the outstanding stock)), acceleration clauses will likely decrease the purchase price. To the extent there are provisions in place (such as unvested equity) that incentivize service providers to stick around the acquirer will see and presumably pay for that additional value. Although the acquirer could separately create (and pay for) an employee/management retention mechanism as part of the deal, that payout would (for the rational acquirer) carve-out from the overall deal value, reducing the consideration allocated to the target company stockholders. Note here the conflict of interest between VC investors and the service providers being bought out).

FN2. A variation suggested here is single trigger plus a minimum X (say 12) months of service before the out.

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

Warrants and Employee Stock Options

Employee stock options and warrants (both give the holder the right to purchase a security at a set price, usually referred to as the "exercise" or "strike" price) function in about the same way but have two basic structural differences (which explain why warrants tend to go to advisor/investor types while options go to employees).FN1

First, from the issuing company's perspective, warrants behave like a financing (albeit with no initial servicing costs like dividends or interest) whereas stock options behave like an employee incentive. This is because although both warrants and stock options are derivative instruments (the value is not in the thing itself but in its derived value from an actual security (i.e., stock)), the stock ultimately issued for a warrant is newly issued stock - prior to the issuance it did not exist - similar to the way new stock is issued to VCs when they make an investment in a start-up.

The stock issued for an exercised option, by contrast, is derived from the previously existing "stock option pool" (which usually comprises somewhere between 5-20% of the outstanding (i.e., already issued) stock of a company).FN2 Thus as a consequence, the exercise of warrants (like the issuance of preferred stock in a seed or series financing), necessarily dilutes existing shareholders (which is a significant event for the company). The exercise of stock options, by contrast, just consumes some portion of the shares set aside for the stock option pool.

Second, from the holders' perspective, a stock option is less valuable because it is subject to a set of restrictions.FN3 While in most cases a warrant implicates the right to purchase the underlying stock at any point in the future at the holder's reasonable discretion (and in some cases the right to transfer that right), a stock option i) can almost never be transferred, ii) is subject to a vesting period and iii) has a limited exercise period (meaning, the stock option, once fully vested (usually four years down the road), has to be exercised within a few months or a year after vesting).FN4

FN1. This discussion solely addresses the common use of employee stock options and warrants in a start-up context. Stock options and warrants can be manifested in myriad ways - practices outside the U.S. in particular add additional complexity.

FN2. If you get fancy, you can argue that if a company does not presume the existence of a employee stock option pool, the relevant distinction between warrants and employee stock options gets exceedingly small.

FN3. Usually. While employee stock options are highly standardized, the terms of warrants are highly customizable.

FN4. The tax implications of warrants and employee stock options depend on the circumstances. As a general matter, warrants are a taxable event upon issuance but options are not, provided, however, that the warrants were issued as part of a financing while the stock options were issued in exchange for future services. If the warrant is compensatory, taxability is deferred under section 83 until exercise.

Sunday, May 1, 2011

Trade Libel

The spectacular growth of user-generated content via twitter, Facebook, Yelp, wikis, video-sharing sites and anything else designated Web 2.0 has given new valence to online character and trade assassination and the legal issues (primarily, defamation) that go along with it.

So far website owners haven't had much to worry about. Under §230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") online service providers (anyone offering a product that allows users to interact and collaborate with each other in a social media dialogue) are generally immune from lawsuits that seek to hold them liable for speech posted by their users. As a consequence the majority of attention in this field has gone to the issue of personal libel and the the liability of individuals like Courtney Love and fashion bloggers who end up tweeting or blogging allegedly scurrilous things about personal enemies.

Trade libel (or commercial disparagement), however, may quietly become a bonafide risk for companies operating in the social media space.FN1 Several court decisions, most notable the Roommates.com case, indicate that immunity under CDA is not absolute.

The risk here is restricted to companies that can be said to have reasonably contributed to or encouraged unlawful conduct by its users. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com (2008) 521 F.3d 1157 (which involved an Internet website that facilitated postings inquiring about the race of a prospective renter) is the prevailing guide on the matter, the court having said (albeit in dicta) that where the service provider “solicits” or otherwise actively participates in generating illegal or defamatory content, then the immunity provisions of the CDA may not apply.

Social media is new enough as a business practice that the relevance of Fair Housing is at best speculative and, further, the practical risk of trade libel may be minimal to most social media companies, however, to the extent a company is specifically modeled to provide a forum for consumers to criticize or complain about businesses (see e.g., ripoffreport.com, complaints.com, etc) and to promulgate such criticisms and complaints, legal exposure is there.

FN1. Trade libel in California is defined as an "intentional disparagement of the quality of property, which results in pecuniary damage to plaintiff." Erlich v. Etner (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 69, 73, 36.